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HIGH-TECH COMPANIES AND THE 
DECISION TO “GO PUBLIC”: ARE 
BACKDOOR LISTINGS (STILL) AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO “FRONT-DOOR” 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS? 
Erik P.M. Vermeulen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial and capital markets play a key role in the funding of 
high growth technology companies. There is little doubt that 
companies in highly capital-intensive, often volatile, and disruptive 
sectors will eventually have to float their shares on a stock exchange to 
obtain access to capital to grow and expand their operations, enhance 
the company’s reputation and visibility, attract and retain talented 
employees, and provide liquidity to shareholders. The traditional path 
to a listing in an equity market is an initial public offering (IPO). 
However, the companies that consider a first sale of stock to the public 
are often overwhelmed by the costly and time-consuming legal and 
financial regulations that must be complied with while pursuing an 
IPO. 
These costly and lengthy regulatory barriers, together with 
sluggish IPO markets and their unavailability to smaller firms, have 
been reasons for high-tech companies and their shareholders to look 
for alternatives to IPOs.1 A popular alternative is to pursue a backdoor 
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1   See Stephen Bell, As IPOs Struggle in Australia, Reverse Takeovers Shine, 
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. AUSTL. (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:52 AM), 
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listing, most often accomplished through a reverse merger or reverse 
takeover.2 Both alternatives “transform” a private company into a 
publicly traded company by combining directly or indirectly with a 
listed company (whether through a merger, exchange offer, or 
otherwise). A backdoor listing has not only allowed companies to 
focus more on their business and less on compliance with “going 
public” rules and regulations, but also to gain access to more liquid and 
robust stock markets. In addition to the cheaper and quicker access to 
capital and liquidity, backdoor listings have also been employed to 
receive tax benefits that stem from “tax loss carry-forwards” in the 
public shell. If the reverse merger or takeover involves a public 
company that operates in the same or complementary industry or 
sector as the private company, synergies are often the reason for the 
backdoor listings. Moreover, besides the fact that a private company 
becomes instantly “listed” on a stock exchange, a backdoor listing 
usually gives shareholders of the private company the opportunity to 
receive the majority of the shares of the public entity, allowing them a 
tight grip on control (as if they still run a private company).3 
Recently, backdoor listings have become increasingly popular 
among high-tech companies in the United States. Consider venture 
capital-backed RMG Networks, a Chicago-based global provider of 
smart visual solutions (particularly advertisements on airplanes and 
airport lounges), which went public through a reverse merger in the 
United States in April 2013, bypassing the IPO procedures. RMG 
Networks was first acquired by SCG Financial Acquisition 
Corporation. As a result, the shareholders of RMG Networks received 
                                                 
http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2013/01/23/as-ipos-struggle-reverse-
takeovers-shine/. 
2   The terms “backdoor listing,” “reverse merger,” and “reverse takeover” 
are used interchangeably. These three approaches, mostly distinguished by legal 
differences at their implementation stage, are alternatives to an IPO.  
3   See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies 
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). See 
also DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: TAKING A COMPANY PUBLIC 
WITHOUT AN IPO (2006). 
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stock in SCG. Subsequently, the listed company’s profile was changed 
from SCG to RMG.4 
Australia also experienced a surge in high-tech backdoor 
listings in 2014.5 For instance, Australian Bitcoin focused company 
digitalBTC (which was acquired by the already listed Macro Energy 
and renamed to DigitalCC Limited) is another example of a high-tech 
(and disruptive) company that turned to a backdoor listing to go public 
in 2014. 
Backdoor listings are also a common “IPO alternative” in the 
real estate development sector. For instance, in October 2013, the 
Hong Kong Parkview Group Limited acquired the commercial 
property portfolio in China from the non-listed subsidiary of Cofco 
Corporation and changed its name to Cofco Land Holdings Ltd.6 
Since backdoor listings are often not excessively burdened by 
complex listing rules and regulations, they are prone to fraud and 
abuse. Certainly, there are probably more examples of instances where 
a backdoor listing has been a prudent and effective alternative to an 
IPO. However, there is also evidence suggesting that lower quality 
firms pursue listings through a reverse merger. It is therefore not 
surprising that policymakers and regulators have recently introduced 
(or are considering) special rules and regulations that govern backdoor 
listings. These rules and regulations vary depending on each country’s 
respective experience with this “going public” alternative. 
This paper attempts to shed light on the question of whether 
and when a backdoor listing is still a sustainable alternative to the 
“front door” IPO. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. For 
instance, stringent and complex rules and procedures for reverse 
                                                 
4   See Sean Ludwig, Digital Signage Biz RMG Networks Goes Public at $10 a 
Share in Reverse Merger, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:36 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/08/rmg-networks-goes-public-reverse-merger/.  
5   See Paul Garvey, ASIC Snarls at Backdoor Listings, AUSTL. BUS. REV. (July 
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backdoor-listings/story-e6frg8zx-1227007785116.  
6   See Esther Fung, Chinese Developers Take the Backdoor to Hong Kong Listings, 
WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (July 1, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
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mergers can be found in the United States due to the scandals 
surrounding backdoor listings involving Chinese companies, 
significantly reducing the attractiveness of backdoor listings. Sweden, 
which has minimal experience with the backdoor listing phenomenon, 
has adopted a more moderate (hybrid) approach that combines a case-
by-case determination of the applicable rules with a system designed 
to create awareness among investors about suspicious backdoor listing 
activities. More specifically, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm has the 
potential to give a reverse merger company a temporary “observation 
status” to alert investors about the risks and uncertainties associated 
with a backdoor listing. Theoretically, Swedish companies that are 
unable or unwilling to conduct an IPO (for instance, due to eligibility 
issues and/or a sluggish IPO market) would still have access to capital 
and/or liquidity more quickly and with fewer costs compared to their 
U.S. counterparts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview 
of the general trends and facts regarding backdoor listings in countries 
with a history of alternative public offerings, such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Section II discusses the general 
perception of backdoor listings from the perspective of high-tech 
companies. Since the availability of the IPO alternative also depends 
on the applicable rules and regulations, Section III compares 
regulatory responses to backdoor listings in the United States, 
Australia, and Sweden. Section IV provides a glimpse into the future 
of backdoor listings by taking into account the changing policy and 
regulatory landscape designed to make it easier for young high-tech 
companies to trade on stock exchanges. In fact, in an effort to spur 
economic growth and job creation, policymakers, regulators, and 
exchange operators are increasingly unveiling measures to relax rules 
and regulations governing IPOs. This is illustrated by the signing of 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) in the United 
States on April 5, 2012. The Act introduces the Emerging Growth 
Company (EGC) status. Companies that are able to secure EGC status 
will be offered a transition period (or an “on-ramp” period) during 
which they are exempted from a number of regulatory requirements 
associated with going public. Such speedier and cheaper IPO process 
will have a reductive effect on the total number of backdoor listings, 
but will not make them completely obsolete. 
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I. TRENDS AND FACTS REGARDING BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
Companies need capital as they go through the stages of their 
life cycles. These life cycles typically start with turning an idea into a 
start-up company. The start-up company attempts to raise capital from 
venture capital funds and other private investors. These investors 
support the start-up by contributing money and services, which brings 
the company to the next stage in its development. Ideally, this 
continues until the moment the company seeks to raise capital from 
the “public” by pursuing an IPO, giving private investors and venture 
capitalists an opportunity to gradually exit their investment. 
The IPO, however, triggers the obligation to comply with a 
plethora of rules and regulations required by regulators to protect the 
shareholders (and other stakeholders) in listed companies and prevent 
managerial misbehavior. These rules and regulations can be divided 
into three categories: (1) listing requirements to determine whether a 
company is eligible to go public; (2) disclosure and transparency rules 
to provide financial and other information to the market and to 
enhance investor confidence; and (3) corporate governance 
requirements to ensure that the company’s affairs are conducted in the 
interests of all concerned. Clearly, the regulatory framework makes the 
process of an IPO expensive and time-consuming. The costs of an 
IPO include the fees paid to investment banks, accountants, auditors, 
lawyers, and other service providers and consultants for advice and for 
preparing the registration statements, prospectus, and other legal 
documents. Low valuations and disappointing IPO performances are 
also reasons for companies to forego the IPO route.7 
It is therefore probably not surprising that companies that 
need capital to fund growth and/or provide liquidity to investors have 
always been looking for quicker, cheaper, and more flexible 
alternatives to get access to stock markets. When it comes to floating 
the shares, the idea of avoiding the costs and complexities associated 
with IPOs is certainly very appealing, particularly to companies that 
operate in volatile, frequently changing, and quickly evolving markets, 
                                                 
7   See Stacy Lawrence, Reverse Mergers Attract Top-Tier Biotechs in Sluggish IPO 
Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 598 (2006).  
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such as the Bitcoin industry.8 Moreover, control over the timing of the 
listing and the information released about the IPO process is usually 
very important to these companies. Clearly, control over both the 
timing and the information not only enables a smoother transition 
from the non-listed status to being listed on public markets, but also 
provides these companies with the opportunity to withdraw their plans 
without alerting the public. Backdoor listings, particularly through 
reverse mergers or reverse takeovers, are examples of these alternatives 
to IPOs that have gained popularity in recent decades. These 
alternatives, however, are often subject to controversy because an 
increasing number of alternative listings fail to meet the expectations 
of investors in the post-listing period. 
Indeed, the growing trend of using backdoor listings is not 
necessarily the consequence of a shift toward a more preferable listing 
option. Literature denouncing reverse mergers as a suitable substitute 
to IPOs is plentiful, and some venture so far as to say that they are not 
even comparable. For instance, a recent empirical study argues that 
going public via an IPO is simply not feasible for many companies that 
do not exhibit significant growth potential, do not meet minimum 
revenue and income levels, or are unable to convince an investment 
bank (typically the gatekeepers to the public) to underwrite its offering. 
The study also shows that most reverse merger companies begin 
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets.9 It should be noted that 
gaining access to traditional forms of additional capital and ensuring a 
liquid market for shares that typically come along with an IPO listing 
are virtually non-existent when pursuing a reverse merger. Therefore, 
a backdoor listing does not always facilitate a large infusion of new 
capital from new investors because it is inherently not a capital-raising 
endeavor where there is exchange of cash for shares in the 
transaction.10 This observation raises the question of why a high-tech 
company should pursue a backdoor listing. 
                                                 
8   See Peter Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, Choice between 
Alternative Routes to Go Public: Backdoor Listing versus IPO, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH 
ON IPOS, 503, 503-30 (Mario Levis and Silvio Vismara eds., 2010).  
9   See Charles M. C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran Zhang, Shell Games: Are Chinese 
Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic? (Working Paper No. 3063, 2014).  
10   See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743 (2008). 
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In this respect, it is remarkable that although backdoor listings 
occur on a global scale, there are significant differences between the 
characteristics, motivations, and implications of these listing options. 
These differences can be explained to a large extent by differences in 
the legal framework applicable to backdoor listings, and also by supply-
demand dynamics (the market for backdoor listings). For instance, 
backdoor listings through reverse mergers have become an attractive 
alternative to an IPO in the United States throughout the previous 
decade. The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the 
number of regular IPOs in 2008.11 
In a reverse merger, a private company that wishes to go public 
through the “backdoor” merges with a public shell. Clearly, in order to 
maintain the trading status, the public shell must survive the merger, 
which explains the term “reverse.” As mentioned above, trades in the 
public shell companies are usually carried out through electronic 
quotation venues such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB) or the “Pink Sheets” system (referring to the color of the 
paper the quotations were printed on). This over-the-counter (OTC) 
market mainly deals in low-grade securities issued by firms in economic 
distress or in “microcap” issues that fail to qualify for a regular listing 
on a stock exchange. Most of the shares traded in these OTC markets 
are of such low value—many of which are “penny stock” shares 
trading under U.S.D. $1 each—that they become perfect targets for 
reverse mergers. 
It should be noted that backdoor listings in the United States 
are often accomplished through a reverse triangular merger instead of 
a direct merger. This form of merger enables the parties to circumvent 
expensive and time-consuming disclosures under the listing rules and 
securities regulations. Under reverse triangular mergers, the publicly 
listed company typically creates a new wholly owned subsidiary, which 
subsequently merges into the private company. The merger must be 
approved by the public shell (as shareholder of its new subsidiary) and 
the shareholders of the private company. Approval from the 
shareholders of the public shell company can be avoided if the 
                                                 
11   The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the number of 
regular IPOs in 2008. See Igor Semenenko, Reverse Merger Waves, Market Timing and 
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company trades on the OTCBB. As a result of the merger, the private 
company becomes the wholly owned subsidiary of the public shell, 
which in return issues shares to the shareholders of the private 
company. At the final stage, the name of the shell is usually changed 
to the name of the private company, and the directors and officers of 
the listed shell are replaced by those of the private company. 
Regardless of how effective reverse mergers might be for meeting the 
needs of a broad range of companies, the lack of regulatory scrutiny 
has clearly caused increasing concerns about the degree to which these 
mergers are used as a means of committing fraud or other securities 
violations, particularly in terms of misleading financial statements. 
In other jurisdictions, supply and demand dynamics, rather 
than the lack of rules and regulations, explain the popularity of 
backdoor listings strategies and arrangements. Consider the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX), which is dominated by the volatile mining and 
high-tech sectors. Companies seeking access to the capital market have 
almost always been able to find a financially distressed listed vehicle 
that could serve as a shell for a backdoor listing. For instance, high-
tech companies in Australia are often able to obtain the listed status 
through shell companies that are active in the mining industry. 
Undoubtedly, some of these high-tech companies have or will become 
targets themselves and are thus fundamental in attaining the backdoor 
listing aspirations of new mining companies.12 Recent data on 
backdoor listings confirms this cycle: while seventy-six percent of the 
Australian backdoor listings were conducted by mining companies in 
2012,13 there was a surge in backdoor listings by high tech companies 
(using unloved mining shells) in the first half of 2014. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, backdoor listings are often 
used by companies that (1) are mainly interested in the synergies that 
can be achieved by merging with (or taking over) a listed operating 
company (this is often combined with raising new capital), and (2) seek 
access to a wider exposure to investors and liquidity when the IPO 
market is weak. What is interesting about the experience of the United 
                                                 
12   See Owen Richards, How Primary and Secondary Markets Work, ASX 
INVESTOR UPDATE (2012) (on file with author). 
13   See Stephen Bell, ‘Back Door’ May Be Closing for Miners, WALL ST. J.: DEAL 
JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/01/30/back-
door-may-be-closing-for-miners/.  
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Kingdom is that it shows that specific rules and regulations do not 
necessarily make backdoor listings less attractive. On the contrary, the 
“backdoor listing” practice in the United Kingdom was more 
widespread than in the United States.14 However, alleged irregularities 
at subsidiaries of Bumi, an Indonesian company that listed on the 
London Stock Exchange through a reverse merger in the summer of 
2011,15 quickly gave a negative notion to backdoor listings. This, 
together with the fact that the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—
now the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—introduced new rules 
with the aim to prevent reverse takeovers of companies that are not 
eligible for listing, explains the sudden decline in the use and popularity 
of backdoor listings in 2012.16 The experiences in the three countries 
show that, besides the applicable rules and regulations, the general 
perception regarding backdoor listings also appears to play a role in 
determining whether a backdoor listing provides a viable alternative to 
high-tech companies that seek to float their shares. 
II. THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
It is a common refrain that backdoor listings are prone to abuse 
and inappropriate transactions. In the early days of the reverse merger 
practice (1970s and 1980s) in the United States, a number of 
opportunistic promoters were fraudulently establishing new shell 
companies that subsequently raised capital through their IPOs.17 After 
the shell company was established, they leaked speculative information 
about an upcoming (reverse) merger to the market in the hope that the 
stock price would rise, which would then give them the opportunity to 
sell shares and make a significant profit. In response to this fraudulent 
                                                 
14   See Peter Roosenboom & Willem Schramade, Reverse Mergers in the United 
Kingdom: Listed Targets and Private Acquirers, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITY SINCE 1990: RECENT RESEARCH AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 181, 182 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., 2007).  
15   See David Oakley, City Watchdog to Tighten Listing Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
2, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2709378-0c8c-11e2-a73c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.  
16   Sylvia Pfeifer, Genel Faces Delay to Premium Listing Plan, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 
23 2012, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6dedca2c-5e44-11e1-85f6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a. 
17   See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends – A Critique of Reverse Merger 
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475 (2006). 
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practice, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a 
number of amendments to the Securities Act 1933 in 1992. The most 
important rule in this context is Rule 419. This Rule introduced a 
“blank check company,” which is defined as a company that: (i) is a 
development stage company that has no specific business plan or 
purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger 
or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or other 
entity or person; and (ii) is issuing “penny stock.” Rule 419 introduced 
special rules for blank check companies. For instance, Rule 419 
required virtually all cash raised during the IPO to be placed in escrow. 
Furthermore, under Rule 419, blank check companies were prohibited 
from trading in the shell’s stock prior to a reverse merger. Rule 419 
also introduced a time limit of eighteen months to complete a 
transaction, and failure to do so would lead to a return of the invested 
cash to the shareholders.18 
The regulatory restrictions on blank check companies are the 
reason for the emergence of Special Purpose Acquisition Vehicles 
(SPAC). Interestingly, SPACs largely mirror the blank check 
companies of the 1980s that caused Congress to adopt Rule 419. The 
business plan for a SPAC is simple. A SPAC is a shell company without 
historical operations that was taken public through an IPO solely for 
the purpose of acquiring an operating business, which is typically not 
pre-determined prior to listing, within an eighteen to twenty four 
month timeline. For entities looking to list through a reverse merger, a 
SPAC can be a favorable partner by offering the operating company 
an immediate cash infusion directly from the proceeds of the SPAC’s 
IPO as well as a liquid trading market for its securities. Though a 
merger with a SPAC eliminates the primary downsides associated with 
a traditional reverse merger, this type of merger is often only a pipe 
dream for less than exceptional operating companies, and the 
likelihood of such a deal is at the whim of the SPAC’s management 
group. 
Despite the introduction of Rule 419 and the restrictions on 
the use of SPACs, the reverse merger or reverse takeover was utilized 
at a greater frequency as a mechanism to list publicly in the lead up to 
2010. In fact, the number of reverse mergers eclipsed the IPO count 
                                                 
18   Offerings by Blank Check Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (1992). 
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in 2008 for the first time in the United States. Clearly, there exists a 
cohort of promulgating instances where the use of a reverse merger 
has been effective. For instance, a reverse merger can be a viable 
mechanism to tap into previously untapped sources of additional 
capital for companies that have exhausted other financing options and 
do not meet the demanding performance criteria necessary to pursue 
an IPO. In such instance, the access to Private Investment in Public 
Equity (PIPE) financing, which is excluded as a financing source for 
private companies, becomes an important potential source of 
invaluable capital for entities with no other viable alternatives.19 A track 
record of institutional investments in underperforming public 
companies with relatively illiquid stocks makes this financing option 
not only a realistic avenue for smaller, less reputable entities, but also 
a means to eventually obtain a listing in a higher segment of one of the 
major stock exchanges.20 
In addition to access to additional avenues of capital, a reverse 
merger tends to be both a quicker and cheaper listing option relative 
to its IPO counterpart. On average, a backdoor listing through a 
reverse merger can be completed in as little as a couple of weeks and 
is unquestionably timelier than an IPO, which can take months. This 
is recently confirmed by the CEO of Bitcoin Shop, a U.S. company 
that operates a Bitcoin-based e-commerce website, who stated (after 
successfully concluding a reverse merger through which the company 
raised U.S.D. $1.875 million in a private placement in February 2014) 
that the reverse merger only took three weeks.21 From a cost 
standpoint, IPOs can run a bill north of the six-figure mark while 
reverse mergers can be done for a significantly lower amount under 
the standard circumstances. However, it is important to qualify the 
speed and cost effectiveness of a reverse merger as it is often touted as 
                                                 
19   See David N. Feldman, Reverse Mergers + PIPEs: The New Small-Cap IPO, 
in PIPES: REVISED AND UPDATED EDITION—A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
IN PUBLIC EQUITY (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., 2005), reprinted in 3 BUS. L. 
BRIEF 34 (2007). 
20   See Helen Luk & Heda Bayron, Sneaking in Through the Back: Chinese 
Companies that have used Reverse Mergers to List on U.S. Regulators are Finally Taking Notice 
and Cosing the Door, A PLUS, May 2011, at 18. 
21   See Bill Meagher, Bitcoin Retailer Raises $1.9M in Reverse Merger, THE DEAL 
PIPELINE, (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/consumer-
retail/bitcoin-retailer-raises-19m-in-reverse-merger.php.  
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a surefire benefit in favor of reverse mergers when that is not always 
the case. In fact, reverse mergers on the slower end of the spectrum 
(more than four months) can take as long as some IPOs. Additionally, 
the cost argument in favor of a reverse merger becomes questionable 
after factoring for the expenses associated with a backdoor listing 
along with the consideration paid to shell promoters in the form of 
cash and sometimes an equity stake. 
High-tech companies that face difficulties in accessing 
domestic capital markets and attracting funding to help them reach the 
next stage in their development also use backdoor listings to enter a 
foreign market. This is particularly true if stock exchanges have a 
competitive interest in encouraging foreign listings. Consider the 
Chinese companies that listed in the United States via reverse mergers. 
According to data collected by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), 159 Chinese companies completed a 
reverse merger between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010.22 Because 
taking the reverse merger route let these companies avoid the scrutiny 
that would otherwise be required by state and federal rules and 
regulations in the United States, the reverse merger count 
outnumbered the number of Chinese companies that completed an 
IPO in the United States in the same period. Clearly, even though 
legally accepted, this trend was only possible with the help of a network 
of U.S. advisors and consultants, such as underwriters, investment 
banks, lawyers, and auditors.23 
Despite the benefits of reverse mergers, there is a notion of 
adverse selection in the pool of entities pursuing a listing through the 
“alternative” listing route. This notion is supported by the delisting of 
forty-two percent of the entities listed via the backdoor within its first 
three years.24 Reverse takeovers are typically exercised by smaller and 
                                                 
22   See PCAOB Issues First Research Note on Chinese Reverse Mergers, PUB. CO. 
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/03152011_ResearchNote.aspx. 
23   David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, China to Wall Street: The Side-Door 
Shuffle, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/global/reverse-mergers-give-
chinese-firms-a-side-door-to-wall-st.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
24   See Frederick Adjei, Ken B. Cyree & Mark M. Walker, The Determinants 
and Survival of Reverse Mergers vs IPOs, 32 J. OF ECON. & FIN. 176, 189 (2008). 
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lesser-known entities relative to their larger, more reputable 
counterparts that list through an IPO, giving rise to a negative signaling 
effect for those that elect to pursue a backdoor listing.25 This notion of 
an adverse selection in entities pursuing a reverse merger is echoed in 
the literature that showcases the decision tree that lay ahead of Chinese 
companies, which account for a large majority of the reverse mergers 
in the late 2000s, when pursuing a public listing.26 Empirical data 
reveals that, despite the benefits of reverse mergers, the most well-
known and profitable Chinese companies generally elect to pursue an 
IPO. By contrast, there are many examples of smaller Chinese entities 
that listed through a reverse merger that are subject to a greater 
frequency of class action lawsuits, are less profitable, exude lower 
balance sheet liquidity, and are highly leveraged.27 
Indeed, many of these Chinese companies ended up being sued 
for securities law violations, particularly related to financial 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose material facts, and/or deficient 
internal control systems. Academic research reveals that U.S. listed 
Chinese companies that pursued a reverse merger were not always in 
compliance with the internationally accepted accounting standards.28 
Customarily, the adoption of these standards is a prerequisite as well 
as a requirement to maintain a public listing for entities pursuing a 
reverse merger, regardless of the accounting practices employed in 
local jurisdictions. This listing obligation underscores the growing 
                                                 
25   See Augusto Arellano-Ostoa & Sandro Brusco, Understanding Reverse 
Mergers: A First Approach (Bus. Econ. Series 11, Working Paper No. 02-17, 2002), 
available at 
http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/66/wb021711.pdf?sequence=1.  
26   See Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann & Ralph Walkling, Reverse Mergers: The 
Chinese Experience (Working Paper No. 2012-03-018, 2014).  
27   The 159 Chinese firms that pursued a reverse merger in the United 
States in the period between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010 had a combined 
market capitalization of U.S.D. $12.8 billion (which is less than fifty percent of the 
market capitalization of the fifty-six Chinese companies that completed a U.S. IPO). 
See Reverse Mergers: A Looming U.S.-China Showdown over Securities Regulation?, WHARTON 
UNIV. OF PA. (March 5, 2013), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/reverse-mergers-a-looming-u-s-
china-showdown-over-securities-regulation/.  
28   See Katherine T. Zuber, Breaking Down a Great Wall: Chinese Reverse 
Mergers and Regulatory Efforts to Increase Accounting Transparency, 102 GEO. L.J. 1307 
(2014). 
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importance of audits and places a tremendous amount of responsibility 
on the auditors of these (often times) foreign entities because they 
usually serve as the only safeguard between the foreign entity and 
ensuring that domestic investors receive reliable statements. 
What is remarkable in this respect is that filings with the SEC 
reveal that Chinese reverse mergers tended to retain their own auditors 
post-merger as opposed to those of the former shell company.29 Audit 
quality concerns in these mergers were only to be expected when 
compliance with PCAOB accounting standards increasingly faltered. 
The large majority of accounting firms employed by Chinese reverse 
mergers were only inspected by the PCAOB on a triennial basis rather 
than the typical annual basis, which had only compounded concerns 
over fraud whirling around Chinese reverse mergers. The questionable 
audit quality and non-compliance has stemmed partially from added 
difficulty for U.S. registered accounting firms to conduct 
comprehensive audits on companies based abroad due to language 
barriers, accounting standard discrepancies, use of under qualified 
assistants, the lack of enforcement of accounting laws in China, and 
additional expenses as well. 
The negative attention regarding backdoor listings has caused 
companies to look at other financing alternatives, such as direct private 
placements or private sales.30 However, although poor performing 
Chinese reverse merger companies are inextricably tied to the general 
perception of reverse mergers, as they account for a large proportion 
of entities pursuing backdoor listing through public shell companies, 
research indicates that the negative spillover effects of fraudulent 
activity or reporting by Chinese companies have not always harmed 
other non-Chinese companies’ backdoor listing activities. Reverse 
mergers involving non-Chinese entities appear to largely escape the 
wrath of investors, as the stock market reaction to news of fraud is 
focused on Chinese companies as opposed to questioning reverse 
                                                 
29   See Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and 
the Rule of Law in China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 119 (2011). 
30   See David Thomas, The IPO Road Less Traveled: Form 10, 
BIOTECHNOW (Feb. 25, 2013) http://www.biotech-now.org/business-and-
investments/inside-bio-ia/2013/02/the-ipo-road-less-traveled-form-10.  
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mergers in general as a viable mechanism to list publicly.31 Still, the 
global turbulence in the credit markets, triggered by the turmoil in the 
subprime mortgage market in 2007-2008, largely brought an end to the 
laissez-faire era in the backdoor listing process. For instance, in 
response to the scandals, U.S. policymakers introduced legislation that 
subjects reverse mergers to registration requirements and provisions 
targeted at improving the companies’ accountability. The backdoor 
listings rules and regulations—and their impact on high-tech 
companies—will be discussed in the next Section. 
III. REGULATORY IMPACT ON BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
Regulatory responses to the increase in backdoor listings vary 
significantly from country to country based on a country’s respective 
experience in this area. These responses can be roughly split into three 
distinct approaches.32 On one end of the spectrum, the United States 
has undertaken a number of initiatives spearheaded by organizations 
such as the SEC and the PCAOB to curb issues stemming from reverse 
mergers in the form of issuing investor warnings and more stringent 
listing rules for these transactions. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Sweden has only limited experience with backdoor listings (and has yet 
to express concern similar to that of the United States). However, to 
ensure that investors have sufficient information to distinguish 
between prudent and imprudent backdoor listings, the Rule Book of 
OMX NASDAQ Stockholm contains a light touch signaling system 
that enables regulators to give companies involved in backdoor listings 
a temporary “observation status.”33 Regulatory responses worldwide to 
the widely publicized backdoor listings/reverse mergers waver 
between the approaches taken by the United States and Sweden, as 
                                                 
31   See Masako N. Darrough, Rong Huang & Sha Zhao, The Spillover Effect 
of Chinese Reverse Merger Frauds: Chinese or Reverse Merger? (Working Paper, 2012).  
32   Rather than making a strict distinction between the different regulatory 
approaches, this Section argues that regulatory measures undertaken by national level 
regulators are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible regulatory paths. It ranges 
from countries that introduced special rules and regulations for backdoor listings via 
countries that implemented rules and regulations that treat backdoor listings as IPOs 
to jurisdictions that adopted a more flexible regulatory approach. 
33   See NASDAQ OMX STOCKHOLM, RULE BOOK FOR ISSUERS 17 r. 2.7 
(2015), available at http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/96/96156_nasdaq-
stockholm-s-rule-book-for-issuers—-1-january-2015.pdf. 
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evidenced by the changes (or lack thereof) in the respective listing rules 
following these developments in Australia. 
A.  Special Rules and Regulations for Backdoor Listings 
In light of the string of alleged fraudulent activity and 
accounting gaffes concentrated within entities that have undertaken 
reverse mergers in the latter portion of the 2000s, the SEC and the 
PCAOB acted swiftly in an attempt to halt further incidents. In 
addition to issuing an investor bulletin highlighting the additional 
potential risks associated with investing in companies that were 
engaged in a backdoor listing process,34 the SEC imposed a wave of 
more stringent listing rules for determining if and when companies are 
eligible to list publicly through the “backdoor.” Additional listing 
requirements include maintaining a closing share price beyond a 
certain threshold, complying with all periodic filing requirements of 
financial reports, and having been traded in the United States on the 
OTC market or another regulated exchange for at least one year prior 
(“seasoning rules”).35 These amendments, which were ultimately 
approved by the SEC in November 2011, aim to address the concerns 
surrounding the inaccuracies of financial statements produced by 
reverse merger companies.36 
In addition, the PCAOB proposed to implement a set of 
supplementary auditing standards in the fall of 2011 by requiring audit 
reports to disclose and identify the names of audit firms or individuals 
that provided more than three percent of the total hours spent on the 
most recent audit.37 The rationale for this additional requirement is 
                                                 
34   See generally Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N  (June 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf. 
35   See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies 
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). 
36   See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rules 
to Toughen Listing Standards for Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm.  
37   Moreover, the PCAOB and China entered into a cooperative 
agreement in October 2012 under which PCAOB inspectors are allowed to observe 
the oversight activities of Chinese regulators. In return, the agreement allows the 
Chinese regulators to observe the work of the PCAOB. See PCAOB Taking Steps to 
Work with China, NASBA STATE BOARD REP., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.nasba.org/files/2012/10/OctoberSBR_2012.pdf. 
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twofold. First and foremost, such a standard helps fulfill consistent 
requests from investors for further information about the firms that 
are performing audits on their investments. Second, the names of 
auditing firms that are located in jurisdictions beyond the PCAOB’s 
current investigatory scope is publicized under this mandate and hence 
allows investors to be better informed about the quality of firms 
conducting a company’s auditing. This is particularly relevant in China 
where the PCAOB and other foreign regulatory bodies are currently 
barred from inspecting China-based audit firms on grounds of 
sovereignty and state secrecy. Though the PCAOB has been trying to 
further cooperation with jurisdictions, such as China, which are 
particularly salient and which make up almost five percent of the 
PCAOB registered firms, additional measures, including the 
publication of the names of foreign auditing firms, are useful steps 
toward greater transparency in audit practices in favor of investors. 
The impact of the seasoning rules and regulatory scrutiny on 
“backdoor listings” is significant. Data provider PrivateRaise recorded 
257 reverse mergers in 2010. After the introduction of the rules, the 
number decreased to “only” 124 companies in 2013.38 Interestingly, 
U.S. healthcare and biotech companies are increasingly willing to 
pursue a backdoor listing despite the seasoning rules. The benefits of 
the informal and flexible reverse merger process often outweigh the 
costs of applying the more cumbersome seasoning rules. According to 
data provider PrivateRaise, at least sixty-nine companies have availed 
themselves of the reverse merger option during the first half of 2014, 
and most of these companies were healthcare and biotech companies.39 
Surprisingly (recall that a backdoor listing is inherently not a capital-
raising endeavor), twenty-eight companies in these reverse merger 
                                                 
38   See Bill Meagher, Alternative Public Offering Market Is Booming, THE DEAL 
PIPELINE (Feb. 24, 2014, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/alternative-public-offering-market-
is-booming.php. 
 39 Bill Meagher, Investment in Reverse Mergers Doubled in Second Quarter, The 
Deal Pipeline (July 21, 2014, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/investment-in-reverse-mergers-
doubled-in-second-quarter.php. 
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transactions were also able to raise a respectable total of U.S.D. $85.6 
million in private placements.40 
B.  Re-Compliance Regulation 
In contrast to the United States, the financial regulatory body 
in Australia has had a rather tepid response to the wave of fraudulent 
backdoor listings. In fact, the Listing Rules of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) makes no specific references to backdoor listings or 
reverse takeovers. However, ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 12, 
which was published in December 2013 and revised in October 2014, 
provides legal certainty for the companies and their advisors by 
explaining how backdoor listings are regulated under Listing Rules 11.1 
(including 11.1.2 and 11.1.3), 11.2, and 11.3.41 The Australian Securities 
Exchange generally compels a listed entity involved in a backdoor 
listing to re-adhere to listing requirements under ASX Listing Rule 11.1 
(proposed change to nature or scale of activities).42 Non-compliance 
with the listing rules could lead to a suspension of the quotation. 
Exceptions to the re-admission process exist only if the 
backdoor listing does not constitute a significant change to the nature 
or scale of the activities of the listed company. However, a close 
reading of the previously mentioned Guidance Note 12 shows that the 
most common backdoor listings will lead to a significant change in the 
nature of an entity’s activity.43 The following activities (associated with 
the mining industry) are explicitly mentioned in the Guidance Note: 
(1) an entity whose main business activity is manufacturing consumer 
goods deciding to switch its main business activity to mining 
exploration (or vice versa); and (2) an entity whose main business 
activity is exploring for minerals deciding to switch its main business 
activity to exploring for oil and gas.44 As for the scale of the activities, 
the ASX considers a twenty-five percent change to the size of an 
entity’s operations to be significant. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that empirical research found that approximately seventy-nine percent 
                                                 
40   Id.  
41   ASX Listing Rules, ch. 12 (Austl. Sec. Exch. 2014). 
42   Id. at ch. 11.1. 
43   Id. at ch. 12. 
44   Id. 
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of the backdoor listings that took place between 1992 and 2007 would 
have been required to re-comply with ASX’s listing requirements.45 
However, the recently revised Guidance Note 12 arguably 
makes backdoor listings more appealing to high-tech companies by 
giving the ASX more flexibility and leeway in interpreting the re-
admission rules. For instance, Guidance Note 12 includes more 
flexible policies on the requirements regarding the minimum spread of 
security holders (usually 400 shareholders each holding shares with a 
minimum value of AUD $2,000). Guidance Note 12 also has a “20 
cent rule,” which requires—with few exceptions—that shares (or other 
securities) offered as part of a backdoor listing should have a minimum 
issue price or sale price of A.U.D. twenty cents or more per share. 
Clearly, the ASX Guidance Notes not only increase the compliance 
rate with the regulatory requirements, but also enhance legal certainty 
and limit possible abuse of the rules, while taking the specifics of 
backdoor listings into account. 
C. A Light Touch—Flexible—Regulatory Approach to Backdoor 
Listings 
The Listing Rules of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm also 
embrace flexibility in assessing backdoor listing processes. First, Rule 
3.3.8 requires listed companies to disclose information to the market 
about significant changes in its identity.46 The information must be 
equivalent to what is required under the IPO regulations. In order to 
determine whether there is a significant change in identity, the Swedish 
regulator typically takes the following criteria into account: (1) changes 
in ownership structure, (2) the acquisition of a new business, and (3) 
the change in market value of the listed company following an 
acquisition. What is interesting is that the exchange has the possibility 
to give a company’s shares a temporary “observation status” if the 
disclosed information is insufficient. The rationale behind this status is 
straightforward: it provides information to the market and warns 
investors and potential investors of the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the company or its shares. The observation status is a 
flexible, but powerful mechanism to remind investors to be cautious 
                                                 
45   See Philip Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, supra note 8.  
46   NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, supra note 33, at r. 3.3.8. 
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about investing in companies that are subject to a reverse takeover.47 
The observation status can only be granted for a limited period of time, 
usually not more than six months. 
Clearly, other measures in backdoor listing procedures 
available to the Swedish regulator are the cancellation or suspension of 
the trading in the shares of a listed company. However, if the regulator 
is of the opinion that more drastic interventions are necessary, 
flexibility remains an important element in the regulator’s decision-
making process. Consider Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc., the 
byproduct of a reverse merger between a privately held Israeli based 
bio-pharmaceutical company (Immune Pharmaceuticals Limited) with 
a listed American developer in pain and cancer treatment (EpiCept 
Corporation).48 The newly merged entity hoped to achieve a public 
listing on the NASDAQ OMX in Sweden following the transaction.49 
It also intended to list on a U.S. securities exchange. Daniel Teper, 
Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. Chairman and CEO, highlighted the 
limitations for Israeli capital markets to fulfill the financing needs of 
companies operating within the life sciences space that are not 
concurrently listed in the United States as the primary cause for 
pursuing a public listing.50 A reverse merger was ultimately elected as 
the mechanism to list, since an IPO was initially not a feasible option 
at the time of the consummation of the merger. 
However, even though an active listed company (such as 
EpiCept), as opposed to a shell company, was involved in the reverse 
merger, the newly merged Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. was not 
immediately allowed to maintain its listing on the regulated NASDAQ 
OMX market in Sweden. Instead, the regulators approved trading of 
the shares of Immune Pharmaceutical Inc. on NASDAQ OMX First 
                                                 
47   Id. at r. 2.7(v). 
48   See Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Immune Pharmaceuticals’ Common Stock 
Approved for Trading on NASDAQ OMX First North Premier, NASDAQ 




 49 Id. 
 50 See Gali Weinreb, Immune Pharmaceuticals Lists in US, Sweden After Reverse 
Merger, GLOBES (Oct. 5, 2015 8:30 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-
1000870466. 
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North Premier, a market for high growth companies that are in the 
process of preparing for a listing at the main market.51 This decision 
reflects the importance of the introduction of less regulated and more 
accessible segments to smaller high-tech companies that would 
otherwise consider entering the market through the backdoor. The 
impact of segmented stock markets on high-tech companies and 
backdoor listings will be discussed in Section IV. 
IV. SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS FOR HIGH GROWTH 
COMPANIES AND BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
The Swedish experience indicates that the outlook for 
backdoor listings is dismal when high-tech companies can list on an 
accessible, vibrant, liquid, and high-growth market. The question, 
however, is whether the benefits of such a market are large enough for 
high-tech companies to completely turn away from the backdoor 
listing route to the stock market. What is important in this respect is 
the gradually changing regulatory landscape for companies that 
consider floating their shares on a stock exchange. Policymakers and 
regulators have introduced (or plan to introduce) more flexible listing 
rules and regulations to stimulate IPO activity by high-tech 
companies.52 These initiatives appear to be successful. For instance, 
the increase of the number of high tech IPOs in the United States in 
2013 and the first half of 2014 could arguably be attributed to the 
possibility of a firm to qualify as an emerging growth company (EGC) 
under the JOBS Act.53 
The EGC label offers several benefits to high growth 
companies in the pre- and post-IPO period. In the pre-IPO period, an 
EGC will only be required to include two years—instead of the usually 
                                                 
 51 Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 48. 
52   For example, in February 2015 the European Commission started a 
consultation process expected to evolve into a E.U.-wide Capital Markets Union. 
The idea is that a small company’s access to financing would be significantly 
improved in a more harmonized capital market. See Commission Green Paper on Building 
a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final (February 18, 2015). 
53   See generally Gillian Tett, Investors Enjoy a Sweet Aftertaste to the Candy Crush 
Crunch, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/39e3e9ba-b418-11e3-a102-00144feabdc0.html.  
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required three years—of audited statements in its IPO registration.54 
More importantly, the special status introduces “testing-the-waters” 
provisions, which allow EGCs to communicate with professional 
investors (qualified institutional buyers or institutional accredited 
investors) to determine investors’ interest in the company prior to or 
following the date of the IPO registration statement.55 Moreover, the 
JOBS Act provides these companies with the possibility to 
confidentially submit a draft of its IPO registration statement for 
review to the SEC.56 
Also, the “on-ramp” provisions grant important reliefs in the 
post-IPO period. For example, EGCs are exempted from the 
obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b) to provide an 
auditor attestation of internal control.57 Furthermore, the Act excludes 
EGCs from (1) complying with the full range of executive 
compensation disclosures and (2) say-on-pay votes on executive 
compensation.58 Finally, EGCs need not comply with any new or 
revised accounting standards until the date on which private 
companies are required to apply these standards to their organization. 
The success of the JOBS Act is reflected by the significant increase in 
the number of EGCs that have pursued a listing after having used the 
option to confidentially file their registration statements. According to 
data provider Renaissance Capital, approximately seventy to eighty 
percent of the 222 IPO companies (including non-venture capital 
backed companies) in 2013 have availed themselves of the JOBS Act’s 
confidential filing provision.59 This is not surprising since high-tech 
companies value increased control over the timing of the IPO, which 
is arguably provided by a confidential filing, more than the likely 
                                                 
54   Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), H.R. 3606, 112th 
Cong. § 102 (2012) (enacted). 
55   Id. at §105. 
56   Id. at §106. 
57   Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404(b) 
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)). 
 
58   Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 953(b)(1) (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78l note). 
59   See David Gelles & Michael J. De La Merced, ‘The New Normal’ for Tech 
Companies and Others: The Stealth I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (February 9, 2014: 
8:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/the-new-normal-for-tech-
companies-and-others-the-stealth-i-p-o/?_r=0. 
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discount in the stock price due to the reduced disclosure and reporting 
requirements for EGCs. 
Clearly, the JOBS Act is a success, but will it send the backdoor 
listing option to oblivion? It is already evident that high-tech 
companies have started to consider the IPO option again in the United 
States. In 2014, 116 high-tech (and venture capital-backed) companies 
floated their shares, compared to eighty-five companies in 2013.60 
However, despite the booming high growth market segment in the 
United States, there has been a surge in reverse mergers, particularly 
conducted by companies that operate in volatile industries. As 
discussed, despite the need to comply with onerous special reverse 
merger regulation, these companies still find that a reverse merger is 
quicker and easier than conducting a traditional IPO (even under the 
JOBS Act). 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous decade, backdoor listings became increasingly 
popular as a mechanism to list publicly in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. However, empirical studies indicate that 
backdoor listing activity has significantly decreased due to negative 
publicity, the introduction of more stringent rules and regulations, and 
increased regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the question is whether 
measures employed to strengthen the rules and regulations governing 
backdoor listings will eventually put an end to this alternative option 
of going public. The evidence is mixed. The number of and amount 
raised by Chinese reverse mergers has plunged approximately fifty-
three percent and ninety-five percent respectively in 2011 (compared 
to 2010). In contrast, we observe a backdoor listing boom in the high-
tech industry in the United States and Australia in 2014. 
The answers to the question of whether backdoor listing is still 
a sustainable alternative for high-tech companies compared to the 
“front door” IPO vary depending on a country’s respective experience 
with backdoor listings. These answers can be divided into four 
categories. In the first category, there are countries such as the United 
States that have a vibrant, accessible, and liquid stock market for high-
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tech companies as well as a long history with backdoor listings. In such 
countries, high-tech companies are willing to accept more stringent 
rules, such as the seasoning rules, if the backdoor listing strategy still 
offers them flexibility as well as low-cost and timing advantages 
compared to the regular IPO route. 
Second, in countries such as Australia, which has no special 
high-tech segment on the stock exchange but has an active market for 
alternative listings, backdoor listings are there to stay even during the 
gloomiest days of the economy. Policymakers and regulators seem to 
understand the importance of alternative public offerings by allowing 
flexibility in the application of the “re-admission” rules. 
The third category includes countries that have a robust and 
liquid high-tech stock market, but no recent experience with backdoor 
listings. The Swedish experience shows that, even though backdoor 
listings are permitted, high-tech companies rarely employ this 
alternative option. This can partly be explained by the lack of available 
shell companies. 
Fourth, even if countries have no history with backdoor 
listings, policymakers and regulators should be wary of the fact that 
entrepreneurial high-tech companies may start to explore alternative 
public offerings if the high-tech segment of the stock market is not 
accessible through relatively cheap and fast means. They should realize 
that backdoor listings continue to provide a viable and legitimate listing 
option for high-tech companies that are always in search for capital 
and liquidity. 
 
